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INTRODUCTION
Recent months have witnessed a flurry of lawsuits under 35 U.S.C.
§ 292, the once-obscure false patent marking statute.' Fueled in large
part by recent Federal Circuit case law that has embraced an expansive
interpretation of the statute, this uptick in activity has alarmed some ob-
servers, who fear that patent owners who market products bearing the
numbers of expired or inapplicable patents could be on the hook for lit-
erally billions of dollars in liability.2 While Congress and the courts
consider various measures intended to rein in perceived abuses on the
part of plaintiffs pejoratively referred to as "marking trolls," one issue
that has failed to attract much notice thus far is the question of how to
calculate an appropriate fine for proven violations of the statute. Al-
though the statute as interpreted by the Federal Circuit permits a court to
assess a fine of "not more than $500" for every falsely marked article,
* Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Nicholas Tymoczko for research assistance; and Laura Arneson, Karin Cotter, Dennis Crouch,
Eran Kahana, Mike Lafeber, and participants at a September 23, 2010 session on false patent
marking sponsored by the Midwest Intellectual Property Institute, for comments and criticism.
Any errors that remain are mine.
1. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 292(a)-(b) (2006). For discussion of some of the recent case law,
see infra Part I.
2. See infra Part I; see also Dionne Searcey, New Breed of Patent Claim Bedevils
Product Makers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2010, at Al (noting that recent rulings have "raised the
stakes in such cases, potentially exposing product makers to huge liabilities").
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(a); Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1300-04
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the statute specifies neither a minimum fine nor a methodology for arriv-
ing at an appropriate number. This Essay proposes that, in order to avoid
imposing arbitrary (and perhaps unnecessarily large) fines for false
patent marking, courts should seek guidance in the law of remedies for
false advertising and copyright infringement. In particular, courts
should attempt to approximate the social harm caused by actionable
false marking by taking into account (1) the plaintiff's loss (if any) and
the defendant's gain (if any) attributable to the false marking at issue; (2)
the plausibility of substantial but less easily quantifiable harms to con-
sumers and to nonparty competitors; and (3) the risks, on the one hand,
of underdeterring statutory violations if the penalty is too small and, on
the other, of chilling patentees from lawfully marking their products if
the risk of liability is too great. In cases in which the likely social harm
from false marking appears minimal, courts should not be reluctant to
impose only nominal fines.
Part I provides a brief overview of the recent controversy over false
patent marking suits. Part II elaborates on my proposal for calculating
optimal fines. Part III concludes with a brief recap and summary of the
proposed framework.
I. FALSE PATENT MARKING: THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
Section 292(a) of the U.S. Patent Act states, in relevant part, that
"[w]hoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connec-
tion with any unpatented article, the word 'patent' or any word or
number importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving
the public ... [s]hall be fined not more than $500 for every such of-
fense." Section 292(b) states that "[a]ny person may sue for the penalty,
in which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the
use of the United States."5 Courts have interpreted this latter provision to
mean that the statute permits plaintiffs to institute so-called qui tam ac-
tions, on behalf of the United States government, against defendants who
have falsely represented their unpatented products as being patented.'
4. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a).
5. Id. § 292(b).
6. See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., 608 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Forest
Grp., 590 F.3d at 1303-04. For purposes of § 292, if a defendant marks its product with the
numbers of two or more patents and the article is not covered by at least one claim of each
patent, the article is mismarked. See Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347,
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("When the statute refers to an 'unpatented article' the statute means
that the article in question is not covered by at least one claim of each patent with which the
article is marked.").
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Nevertheless, until recently this false marking statute was rarely invoked
due to the courts' narrow interpretation of the language authorizing the
fine ("not more than $500 for every such offense"). In particular, a num-
ber of courts held that a defendant that violated the statute by falsely
marking as patented its unpatented Product X committed a single of-
fense, authorizing a fine of at most $500, regardless of how many copies
of Product X the defendant sold. In late 2009, however, in Forest Group,
Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit rejected this line of precedent, holding that "the statute's plain
language requires the penalty to be imposed on a per article basis."' As a
result, a defendant that falsely marks thousands or millions of identical
products is now potentially liable for billions or even trillions of dollars
in fines.9 Not surprisingly, Forest Group quickly generated a cottage in-
dustry of false patent marking suits directed against some of the nation's
largest corporations.'o False marking actions received a further boost in
June 2010 when, in Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., the Federal Circuit held
that marking a product with the number of a patent that once covered
some aspect of the product but has since expired also can violate the
statute." Most recently, in August 2010, the Federal Circuit held that
violation of §292 "inherently constitutes injury to the United States,"
and that a private plaintiff therefore has Article III standing to assert a
qui tam action under the statute, regardless of whether the government
The term "qui tam" is short for "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hoc parte
sequitur," meaning "who as well for the lord the king as for himself sues." 8 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 72 (1st ed. 1933).
7. See Forest Grp., 590 F.3d at 1301-02 (noting that some courts had followed the
interpretation of London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506 (1st Cir. 1910), that "the
continuous false marking of multiple articles should constitute a single offense," while others
"adopted a time-based approach" under which a new fine would accrue for each day, week, or
month of false marking).
8. Id. at 1301.
9. See, e.g., Justin E. Gray & Harold C. Wegner, The New Patent Marking Police:
Answering Clontech and Forest Group, GRAY ON CLAIMS, 5 (Jan. 8, 2010), http://
www.grayonclaims.com/storage/MarkingPoliceVers4.pdf (noting that Solo Cup allegedly sold
twenty-one billion coffee cup lids marked with expired patent numbers, thus implying a po-
tential liability of over $10 trillion); Erik Sherman, Apple Faces $60 Billion Patent Lawsuit,
WIRED IN (July 19, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/technology-business/apple-faces-60-
billion-plus-patent-lawsuit/4451 (estimating that, given the number of iPhones and iPods that
Apple has sold to date, its potential liability in one currently-pending suit could total $60 bil-
lion). As the statute indicates, half of the fine goes to the qui tam plaintiff. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 292(b).
10. For a frequently updated list of cases filed since Forest Group, see False Marking
Case Information, GRAY ON CLAIMs, http://www.grayonclaims.com/false-marking-case-
information/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). As of this writing, this source lists over 400 cases
filed since January 1, 2010.
I1. Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1361-62.
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has suffered any proprietary injury or the private plaintiff any personal
injury."
To be sure, the prospect of corporations being forced to pay millions
or billions of dollars in fines as a result of false marking liability may be
somewhat exaggerated. For one thing, to prevail on a false marking
claim the plaintiff must prove not only false marking but also deceptive
intent.' In Solo Cup and other cases, the defendant ultimately prevailed
in rebutting the inference that its sale of products marked with expired
patent numbers was intentionally deceptive.14 A variety of other obstacles
may also prevent some claims from going forward," and attorneys are
12. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., Nos. 2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL
3397419, at *3-6 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010). Some district courts had reached conflicting
conclusions on this issue. Compare Shizzle Pop, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. CV 10-3491
PA (FFMx), 2010 WL 3063066, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010) (concluding that the
plaintiff had standing), with U.S. ex rel. FLFMC, LLC v. Wham-O, Inc., No. 10cv0435,
2010 WL 3156162, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2010) (concluding that a non-competitor plain-
tiff lacked standing). Some others had stayed proceedings pending the Federal Circuit's
decision in Stauffer. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. FLFMC, LLC v. William Bounds, Ltd., Civil
Action No. 10-0420, 2010 WL 2990725, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 28, 2010); S.F. Tech. v. Glad
Prods. Co., No. 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2943537, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 26,
2010). Presumably those stays will now be lifted.
13. See, e.g., Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1362; Forest Grp., 590 F.3d at 1300; Clontech
Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
14. See Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1362-65 (stating that "the combination of a false state-
ment and knowledge that the statement was false creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to
deceive the public," but that "mere knowledge that a marking is false is insufficient to prove
intent if [defendant] can prove that it did not consciously desire the result that the public be
deceived," and that where "the false markings at issue are expired patents ... the Clontech
presumption of intent to deceive is weaker," and concluding that Solo rebutted the presump-
tion by demonstrating that it acted "in good faith reliance on the advice of counsel and out of a
desire to reduce costs and business disruption," representing only that its products "may be
covered" by certain patents, and providing consumers with a website address for further in-
formation (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Clontech, 406 E3d
at 1353-59 (affirming a finding of deceptive intent with respect to certain products and revers-
ing as to others); Harrington v. CIBA Vision Corp., No. 3:08-cv-00251-FDW-DCK, 2010 WL
2889584, at *6 (W.D.N.C. July 21, 2010) (holding that, "even assuming, arguendo, that there
was a false statement," plaintiff "failed to satisfy the high bar set for proving deceptive in-
tent").
15. Some courts, for example, have concluded that false marking claims sound in fraud
and therefore implicate the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 9(b). See, e.g., Brinkmeier v. BIC Corp., No. 09-060 SLR, 10-01-SLR, 2010 WL
3360568, at *8 (D. Del. Aug. 25, 2010); Hollander v. Etymotic Research, Inc., No. 10-526,
2010 WL 2813015, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2010) (collecting cases on both sides of the
issue); Promote Innovation LLC v. Ranbaxy Labs. Inc., No. 2:10-CV-121-TJW-CE, 2010 WL
3120040, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. July 14, 2010) (collecting cases on both sides of the issue). Oth-
ers have held that only one relator may bring a qui tam action with respect to a given course of
conduct, and have dismissed later-filed actions brought by other plaintiffs. See S.F. Tech., Inc.
v. Glad Prods. Co., No. 10-CV-00966 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2943537, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26,
2010); Simonian v. Quigley Corp., No. 10 C 1259, 2010 WL 2837180, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 19,
2010). But see Simonian v. Hunter Fan Co., No. 10 C 1212, 2010 WL 2720749, at *2-3 (N.D.
Ill. July 8, 2010) (concluding that § 292 does not contain a first-to-file limitation). Litigants
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advising corporate clients to monitor and, where necessary, modify their
product marking practices to minimize the risk of liability."' Further-
more, legislation introduced in Congress earlier this year would limit
§ 292 to plaintiffs who have suffered competitive injury, and would per-
mit them to recover only "damages adequate to compensate for the
injury.""
Meanwhile, debate continues on the merits of allowing private
claims for false patent marking. Supporters of these claims, including
some Federal Circuit panels, argue that false patent marking discour-
ages potential competitors and inventors from entering markets from
which no valid, existing patent actually bars them (or else that it en-
courages them, unnecessarily, to "design around" what they believe to be
applicable patents); that it raises the cost of determining whether a prod-
uct is covered by an existing, valid patent or patents; and that it
potentially defrauds consumers, who may rely on a product's supposed
have also raised challenges under the "Appointments" and "Take Care" clauses of the Consti-
tution, though so far without success. See Shizzle Pop, 2010 WL 3063066, at *3; Pequignot v.
Solo Cup Co., 640 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724-28 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). And, while the Federal Circuit has held that plaintiffs must
prove the elements of a false marking claim only by a preponderance of the evidence, see
Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1355, one might question whether this is correct, given the court's char-
acterization of the statute as "a criminal one, despite being punishable only with a civil fine,"
Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1363 (citation omitted). The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Stauffer
does not expressly address these issues. See Stauffer, 2010 WL 3397419, at *5-7 (expressly
not reaching the "Take Care" issue, remanding for consideration of Brooks Brothers' argument
that the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 9(b), and stating that "the government would not be
able to recover a fine from Brooks Brothers if Stauffer loses, as resjudicata would attach to
claims against Brooks Brothers for the particular markings at issue").
16. See, e.g., MaryDilys Anderson & Michael Siekman, Risks of False Marking: Re-
ducing a Company's Exposure, 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 21. 23-24 (2010)
(recommending, inter alia, "preparing and documenting a commercially reasonable plan to
update ... product marking"); James Blackburn et al., "False Patent Marking" Suits: How
Judges and IP Rights Holders Can Respond to New Litigation Trend, WASH. LEGAL FOUND.
(Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalopinionletter/8-06-
IOBlackburn LegalOpinionLetter.pdf (suggesting a similar approach); Michael O'Neill, False
Patent Marking Claims: The New Threat to Business, 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 22, 29-
30 (2010) (suggesting a similar approach).
17. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 2(k) (2010), available at
http://www.patentbaristas.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/GRAI0057.pdf; H.R. 4954,
111th Cong. § 1(a) (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=
hI 11-4954. As a stand-alone bill, perhaps House Bill 4954 stands a better chance of being
enacted than do more comprehensive patent reform bills, such as Senate Bill 515, that have
been introduced since 2005.
More recently, Congressman Bob Latta introduced an alternative measure, the Patent
Lawsuit Reform Act of 2010, H.R. 6352, 111th Cong. (as introduced Sept. 29, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 11-6352. This bill also limits
standing to plaintiffs who have suffered competitive injury and restores the status quo ante
Forest Group by capping the fine at "$500, in the aggregate, for all offenses in connection
with" the unpatented articles at issue. Id. § 2(a)-(b).
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patented status as an indicium of quality.'8 Critics, meanwhile, question
whether firms are likely to avoid competing without first investigating
whether the patents allegedly covering a product are valid and still in
force.' 9 In addition, they argue that the cost of determining whether a
given patent has expired is relatively low,20 and some have argued that
potential competitors may actually benefit from reviewing the technol-
ogy disclosed in an expired or subsisting patent.2' By contrast, the cost to
the patentee of strictly complying with the statute can be significant. An-
other provision of the Patent Act requires patentees to mark their
products with the numbers of any patents incorporated therein if they
wish to maximize their potential damages recovery in the event of in-
fringement.22 Moreover, in the case of a product covered by multiple
patents-which may include not only high-tech products like cell phones
and PCs but also relatively low-tech products like Solo's cup lids-the
cost of changing the product mold or labeling each time a patent expires
can be significant.23 To the extent these costs are passed on to consumers,
they reduce whatever net benefits may arise from truthful marking. Al-
ternatively, some commentators have suggested that firms may respond
18. See Forest Grp., 590 F.3d at 1302-03; Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356-57 & n.6; Pe-
quignot v. Solo Cup Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653-54 (E.D. Va. 2008); Elizabeth 1. Winston,
The Flawed Nature of the False Marking Statute, 77 TENN. L. REV. 111, 115, 132-34 (2009);
Bonnie Grant, Note, Deficiencies and Proposed Recommendations to the False Marking Stat-
ute: Controlling Use of the Term "Patent Pending," 12 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 283, 283, 289-92
(2004).
19. See Laura N. Arneson, Note, Defining Unpatented Article: Why Labeling Products
with Expired Patent Numbers Is Not False Marking, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 35-36), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1599902.
20. See id. (manuscript at 29); Gray & Wegner, supra note 9, at 5. The Federal Circuit
takes issue with this point in Solo Cup, however, noting the possibility for patent term exten-
sions in some cases, and of premature expiration due to failure to pay maintenance fees in
others. See Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1362; see also Corey McCaffrey, Note, The Virtues of Vir-
tual Marking in Patent Reform, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 27 &
nn.146-47), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1618162 (noting that expiration dates are
not printed on the face of the patent, and that they "are not always easy to calculate").
21. See Arneson, supra note 19 (manuscript at 29-31) (limiting discussion to expired
patents); McCaffrey, supra note 20 (manuscript at 27). The Federal Circuit took issue with
this point in Clontech. See Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356 (rejecting, as contrary to the statutory
mandate, defendant's argument that "there is no harm in marking products with patents even
when those products do not fall within the bounds of properly construed claims because the
additional marking" would enable the "public to undertake the appropriate investigation and
... to take steps to avoid infringement") (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability
and Its Alternatives in Patent Lw, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 801-07 (2002).
23. See Solo Cup, 608 F.3d at 1358-59, 1364-65; Searcey, supra note 2, at Al (noting
that Solo had "more than 3,000 molds for its products that were stamped with erroneous pat-
ents").
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to these risks and costs by simply abandoning marking altogether.2 4 If
liability risks (including the cost of even a successful defense in a patent
marking suit) cause firms to reduce the amount of truthful marking,
however, the notice function that patent marking is supposed to serve2 is
undermined; so too is the patent incentive scheme, to the extent the pat-
ent incentive depends on firms being able to recover the full measure of
their provable damages in the event of infringement.26
Finally, whether consumers are likely to infer, incorrectly, that pat-
ents necessarily signify product quality is a question that participants in
the current debate have yet to empirically support. Significantly, Lanham
Act false advertising claims, which require proof that a misrepresenta-
2'tion was likely to affect consumers' purchasing decisions, rarely
involve claims of false patent marking." If widespread false marking is
having a deceptive influence on consumer behavior, it seems odd that
more Lanham Act plaintiffs had not seized the opportunity to challenge
24. See Arneson, supra note 19 (manuscript at 32-33) (noting that to the extent false
marking litigation discourages marking, it risks making it more difficult for potential competi-
tors to determine if an article is patented); Searcey, supra note 2, at Al (quoting attorney
Robert Koch as stating that he now "advises his clients to stop marking patents on their prod-
ucts").
25. See, e.g., Lee v. Accessories by Peak, 705 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257-58 (W.D.N.Y.
2010) ("[The patent marking statute] serves the three related purposes of (1) helping to avoid
innocent infringement, (2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that the article is
patented, and (3) aiding the public to identify whether an article is patented.").
26. See supra text accompanying note 22.
27. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d
1242, 1250-51 (l1 th Cir. 2002). A minority of courts, however, would presume that a literally
false statement is material to consumers' purchasing decisions. See, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v.
Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2000).
28. A few courts have held or suggested that falsely representing that one's goods are
covered by a patent, copyright, or trademark rights (or that such rights are pending) may con-
stitute false advertising under the Lanham Act. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3, cmt. c, illus. 3 (1995); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADE-
MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:78 (4th ed. 2010); Grant, supra note 18, at 296-98.
Such cases nevertheless appear to be few and far between, though perhaps in part because
merely marking a product may not constitute "commercial advertising or promotion" (a pre-
requisite for liability under the Lanham Act). Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § I125(a)
(2006). Advertisements falsely asserting patent rights, however, would be actionable under the
Lanham Act if all of the other elements of a false advertising claim were satisfied, as well as
potentially actionable under 35 U.S.C. § 292(a). For a discussion of the difficulties plaintiffs
face in successfully alleging false marking as a Lanham Act violation, see Thomas M. Wil-
liams, False Patent Marking Claims Under the Lanham Act, 79 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) No. 607, (Mar. 22, 2010) (describing "proving that defendants' false patent mark-
ings were material to the purchasing decision . .. and that the plaintiffs were injured, or likely
to be injured, as a result" as "a tall task"). See also Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tooi Co., Civil
Action No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (dismissing
Lanham Act counterclaim based on false patent marking-the same false patent marking that
gave rise to Bon Tool's successful § 292 counterclaim-absent evidence of materiality and
injury), rev'don other grounds, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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false marking long before Forest Group made § 292 an attractive alterna-
tive.
One issue that has received surprisingly little attention thus far in the
debates over § 292 is how to calculate the appropriate fine in cases in
which a court concludes that the defendant has violated the statute. This
issue is unlikely to go away, however, even if Congress or the Federal Cir-
cuit decide to limit false marking claims to competitor plaintiffs. Although
claims by noncompetitors have attracted the lion's share of attention thus
far, anecdotal evidence suggests that claims by competitors-sometimes
asserted as counterclaims when those competitors are themselves sued
29
for patent infringement-also may be on the rise,. Indeed, as long as
Forest Group and Solo Cup remain good law, one would expect parties
to infringement litigation to assert false marking claims whenever the
facts may so warrant (subject, of course, to the possibility that asserting
such a claim risks retaliation in kind).
Thus far, however, courts have provided very little guidance on how
to set the appropriate statutory fine. In Forest Group, the Federal Circuit
stated that a court need not always
fine those guilty of false marking $500 per article marked. The
statute provides a fine of "not more than $500 for every such of-
fense." 35 U.S.C. § 292(a). By allowing a range of penalties, the
statute provides district courts the discretion to strike a balance
between encouraging enforcement of an important public policy
and imposing disproportionately large penalties for small, inex-
pensive items produced in large quantities. In the case of
inexpensive mass-produced articles, a court has the discretion to
determine that a fraction of a penny per article is a proper
penalty.30
On remand, the district court noted that Forest Group had sold thirty-
eight falsely marked stilts at prices between $103 and $180, and con-
cluded that "the appropriate fine in this case is $180.00 per article, the
highest point of the price range," because "[tihis will deprive Forest of
more than it received for the falsely-marked stilts, fulfilling the deterrent
29. See, e.g., Plasticos Vandux de Colombia S.A. v. Robanda Int'l, Inc., No. 10-60188-
Civ., 2010 WL 2721852 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2010); Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., Civil
Action No. 08-862-LPS, 2010 WL 2545959 (D. Del. June 24, 2010); Juniper Networks v.
Shipley, No. C 09-0696 SBA, 2010 WL 986809 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2010); Third Party Veri-
fication, Inc. v. Signaturelink, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2007). Alternatively, if
Congress were to enact the Patent Reform Act proposal that courts award actual damages,
courts would have to struggle with the question of how to calculate those damages.
30. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration
in original).
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goal of § 292's fine provision."" In another recent case, a magistrate
judge recommended a fine amounting to ten percent of the total revenue
the defendant earned on sales of 1127 falsely marked items; 2 while in a
third, a court imposed a fine equal to about thirty-two percent of the total
revenue earned from sales of 651,675 falsely marked articles." In none
of the three district court cases, however, have the courts articulated any
clear framework for determining how to calculate an appropriate penalty
in other cases. 4
II. A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR IMPOSING RATIONAL FINES
As noted in Part I, courts have suggested that false marking poten-
tially causes social harm by (1) discouraging would-be inventors and
competitors from competing against the firm that engages in false mark-
ing, or alternatively by encouraging them to engage in unnecessary
design-around efforts; (2) raising the cost of evaluating whether a given
patent really does cover the product at issue; and (3) defrauding consum-
ers, who may assume that a (falsely marked) product is superior to
31. Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., Civil Action No. H-05-4127, 2010 WL 1708433,
at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2010).
32. See Custom Designs of Nashville, Inc. v. Alsa Corp., Civil No. 3:08-0665, 2010
WL 2991247, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 27, 2010).
33. See Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., No. 08-CV-335-
IEG (NLS), 2010 WL 1462757, at *42 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2010) (concluding that the fine
would be "substantial enough to enforce the public policy embodied in the statute and to deter
any similar violations," and that "by not imposing a disproportional liability for what appears
to be an 'inexpensive mass-produced article,' the fine serves its deterrent function without
over-penalizing" the defendant).
34. Pre-Forest Group cases in which courts imposed fines for false patent marking do
not appear to have engaged in any deeper analysis. For example, a review of the cases cited in
Forest Group itself in which courts imposed fines-including the district court opinion under
review-shows that in all but one the court simply awarded the statutory maximum of $500
per offense (under the 1952 Act) or the statutory minimum of $100 (under pre-1952 law). See
Forest Grp., 590 F.3d at 1302 (citing Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Nautilus Grp., Inc.. No.
1:02 CV 109 TC, 2006 WL 753002, at *16 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2006); Undersea Breathing
Sys., Inc. v. Nitrox Techs., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 752, 782 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Sadler-Cisar, Inc. v.
Commercial Sales Network, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1287, 1296 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Joy Mfg. Co. v.
CGM Valve & Gauge Co., 730 F. Supp. 1387, 1399 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Precision Dynamics
Corp. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 241 F. Supp. 436, 447 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Krieger v. Colby,
106 F. Supp. 124, 131 (S.D. Cal. 1952)). The one exception is Enforcer Products, Inc. v. Bird-
song, No. 1-93-CV-1701-CC, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *25 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 29,
1995), aff'd per curian, 98 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1996), in which the court-foreshadowing
the result in Forest Group-imposed a fifty dollar per article fine, but without explaining its
methodology. (Forest Group cites this case, but with an incorrect date. See Forest Grp., 590
F.3d at 1302.) The legislative history of § 292 similarly sheds no light on the appropriate
methodology for calculating the fine. See S. REP. No. 1979, at 22 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2424 ("The minimum fine [under § 292], which has been interpreted by
the courts as a maximum, is replaced by a higher maximum.").
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non-patented substitutes." This last harm also potentially affects com-
petitors of the firm engaging in the false marking, by depriving them of
sales they otherwise would have made. These potential harms are analo-
gous to the harms that are often said to result from false advertising.
Like false patent marking, false advertising (when successful) may dis-
courage competition against a firm that falsely claims product
superiority; raise the costs of evaluating the claims made in all advertis-
ing, both truthful and untruthful; and defraud consumers and deprive
truthful competitors of sales they otherwise would have made. Whether
the analogy to false advertising is an apt one is ultimately an empirical
question. Perhaps would-be inventors and competitors are not so easily
cowed into submission; they might, in any event, double-check the scope
and validity of patents that claim to cover products with which they in-
tend to compete. In addition, perhaps consumers pay little attention to
patent marking or accord little weight to the fact that a product is pat-
ented.3" Finally, commentators on the law of false advertising have long
noted that, if the standard for imposing liability is too strict, the penalty
too harsh, or the risk of error too large, the end result may be counter-
productive-firms may compete less (and consequently leave consumers
worse off) if the law inhibits them from making all but the most ano-
dyne, least informative claims about their products. 9 So too, at least
35. See supra text accompanying note 18.
36. See Barton Beebe et al., Trademarks, Unfair Competition and Business Torts,
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript ch. 9, at 4-5) (on file with author) (citing George Akerlof,
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON.
488 (1970) ("In the extreme, false advertising might tend to drive out of truthful advertising,
because firms would be unable to signal truthful private information about their products in
ways that consumers could trust.")). In a related vein, Dennis Crouch suggests that false mark-
ing may implicate "systemic problems created by misinformation and over-assertion of legal
rights," disrupting "our social confidence in the rule of law." E-mail from Dennis D. Crouch,
Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law, to author (Sept. 1, 2010) (on file with
author).
37. Courts invalidate almost half of all patents asserted in litigation, after all. See John
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-07 (1998); see also Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent
Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 tbl.1 (2006) (finding that accused infringers win
about three out of four patent infringement cases). Alternatively, competitors might simply
ignore those patents. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19-
22 (2008) (stating that many companies ignore patents). In addition, and as noted above, the
cost of determining whether a patent is simply still in force is often (if not always) low. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
38. See Grant, supra note 18, at 289-91 (noting the lack of empirical evidence thus far
of consumer reliance on patent marking).
39. See Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 209 F.3d 1032, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (expressing concern that if advertisers had to conform their ads to the understanding
of even small numbers of easily misled consumers, they would reduce "ads and packaging to
meaningless puffery"); Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV.
657, 688-92 (1985); Beebe et al., supra note 36, ch. 9, at 37.
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potentially, with false marking: if the liability standard or the penalty is
excessive, or the risk of error too high, patentees might respond by re-
ducing or eliminating patent marking altogether." Such a response would
threaten to make competitors and consumers worse off, because it would
reduce not only false but also truthful marking, and thus potentially im-
pede competition by making it more difficult to discover which patents
potentially cover a given product. 41 Moreover, since patent marking is
often a prerequisite to a full award of patent damages, a regime that dis-
courages lawful patent marking risks undermining the patent incentive
by interfering with patent owners' ability to recover the full measure of
their provable lost profits or reasonable royalties in the event of in-
fringement.42
Nevertheless, for present purposes we will concede that negative so-
cial consequences can at least sometimes result from false patent
marking as defined by the courts. As a first approximation, then, the op-
timal fine for false patent marking would be one that forces patentees to
internalize the net social costs of false marking, or, on the assumption
that the private gain from false marking and the social cost are roughly
equal, one that makes false marking unprofitable to the faux patentee.
The minimum penalty that would serve this purpose would be one that is
precisely equal to the social harm/private gain, though perhaps in some
cases (for example, where the probability of detection and enforcement
is less than one) a multiplier might be necessary to achieve optimal de-
terrence." At the same time, however, a fine that greatly exceeds the
40. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
41. To the extent, if any, that truthful patent marking serves its intended purposes of
putting competitors on notice that certain products are patented and of providing consumers
with some sort of signal about the qualify of those products, see supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text. A reduction in truthful patent marking would undermine these purposes, potentially
to the detriment of both competitors and consumers. Whether truthful patent marking actually
does serve these purposes very effectively is a matter on which I remain agnostic (though
some audience members at a recent Midwest Intellectual Property Institute at which I spoke
suggested that patent marking is sometimes an effective marketing tool, at least in some non-
U.S. markets). If, however, empirical evidence were to show that neither competitors nor con-
sumers actually pay much attention to patent marking, then a reduction in the amount of
truthful patent marking would not necessarily increase any social costs. At the same time,
however, evidence of the irrelevance of patent marking would also seem to undercut the need
for an aggressivefalse patent marking regime.
42. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
43. In theory, the social harm could exceed the private gain. One might imagine a case,
for example, in which false marking dissuaded a firm from competing against the offender (or
deprived that firm of sales of competing products), and that firm's products would have led to
greater positive spillover effects later. But whether false patent marking frequently causes
such extensive social harms in excess of the defendant's private gain seems speculative.
44. For an overview of the literature on damages multipliers, see Thomas F. Cotter, An
Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and Attorney's Fees for Willfid Patent Infringe-
ment, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 308-14 (2004). The basic idea is that, if a particular act of
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social harm/private gain caused by false marking risks counterproductive
effects. In particular, if the probability a court will erroneously determine
that the defendant violated the statute is greater than zero, even a small
risk of potentially ruinous liability may induce some patentees to forgo
marking altogether. This would be a social loss, for the reasons discussed
above. 45 How, then, should courts go about approximating the social
harm/private gain resulting from false marking? Fortunately, the law of
unfair competition and copyright provides some assistance in making
this approximation in analogous circumstances.
Turning first to the law of unfair competition, the prevailing.plain-
tiff46 in a trademark or false advertising action is normally awarded
injunctive relief.47 Of greater relevance in the present context, in an ap-
propriate case the plaintiff may also recover monetary relief in the form
of compensatory damages or disgorgement of the defendant's profits
attributable to the misconduct at issue.48 Compensatory damages gener-
ally take the form of lost profits resulting from sales lost to the defendant
(though these can be difficult to prove when the relevant market consists
of more than two firms),49 as well as reasonably necessary out-of-pocket
misconduct causes X amount of harm but is likely to go undetected with probability Y, the
penalty should be set at X/Yin order to achieve optimal deterrence. See id. at 310-11.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26, 38-40. The loss would be compounded
if patentee's agents are risk-averse. See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent
Law's Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 34-35 (Oct. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (explaining how risk aversion on the part of the patentee's agents may affect
behavior).
46. In a trademark case, this will be the trademark owner. See ROGER D. BLAIR &
THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 183 (2005). In a Lanham Act false advertising case, the prevailing
plaintiff is typically a competitor of the defendant. See, e.g., Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1164-66 (11th Cir. 2007); Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., II
F.3d 1163, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1993).
47. See, e.g., BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 46, at 36; Beebe et al., supra note 36, ch. 8,
at 243, ch. 9, at 226.
48. See Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
49. See, e.g., Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1333-36 (8th Cir.
1997); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Enhanced damages are sometimes awarded for willful infringement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
(stating that "the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for
any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount,"
and if the court instead awards defendant's profits, if it finds the amount "either inadequate or
excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to
be just, according to the circumstances of the case," but that in either instance the award "shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty"); BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 46, at 84-85. In
ALPO, on remand the district court listed three factors relevant to determining whether a dam-
ages award is inadequate (and hence a candidate for enhancement): "the impact of the
unlawful conduct directly upon the plaintiff competitor, the systemic distortion which the
wrongdoer's conduct has upon the particular product market in which the plaintiff must com-
pete in the future, and the costs incurred by the competitor in its efforts to mitigate its
damages." ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 778 F. Supp. 555, 564 (D.D.C. 1991),
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costs, such as the cost of having conducted a responsive advertising
campaign.o The disgorgement remedy, by contrast, has traditionally
been available only when the defendant is found to have acted "will-
fully" or in "bad faith."" In previous work on the law and economics of
trademark remedies (the reasoning of which is equally applicable to false
advertising), Roger Blair and I have argued that limiting the disgorge-
ment remedy to cases involving bad faith may make sense, given the risk
of overcompensation if such awards were more freely available. 2 Al-
though the plaintiff is, strictly speaking, entitled only to the portion of
the defendant's profits attributable to the infringement or false advertis-
ing, the burden is on the defendant to prove what portion of its profits
are not so attributable;" errors therefore may be biased in favor of plain-
tiffs. In the case of willful misconduct, this may not be such a problem,
either on moral or economic grounds; in the case of willful trademark
infringement in particular, the vast majority of the defendant's profits
from the sale of a given product may be attributable to willful miscon-
duct.5 4 In cases involving non-willful misconduct, by contrast, the risk of
overcompensation (and thus over-deterrence of lawful behavior on the
part of others) may counsel in favor of awarding actual damages or (in
the case of trademark infringement) reasonable royalties based on com-
parable licenses, rather than a disgorgement of the defendant's profits."
As for statutory damages, the Copyright Act permits the prevailing
plaintiff (subject to certain qualifications) to an award of damages in lieu
of actual damages or defendant's profits, in the amount of $750 to
$30,000 for each work infringed.56 Like the $500 per offense cap in the
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 997 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Statutory dam-
ages are available for trademark counterfeiting, see 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), and treble damages
for intentional counterfeiting, see 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
50. See ALPO, 913 F.2d at 969 (stating that the plaintiff may recover damages for re-
sponsive advertising expenses or other damage control costs it has incurred, to the extent these
expenses were reasonably necessary to counter the defendant's false advertising); see also
Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 689-95 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating
that, in an appropriate case, damages may be awarded for lost profits, lost goodwill, and dam-
age control).
51. See, e.g., ALPO, 913 F.2d at 968-69. Some recent decisions have concluded that the
Lanham Act no longer requires proof of willfulness as a precondition to an award of defen-
dant's profits. Compare Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2005), with
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280-82 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). Though these latter two cases involved trademarks, they interpret the same
section of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)) that would be applicable in a Lanham Act
false advertising case in which damages are at issue.
52. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 46, at 84-89.
53. See id. at 37.
54. See id. at 86-87.
55. Beebe et al., supra note 36 ch. 8, at 250-51; see BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 46, at
86-87.
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
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false marking statute, the damages range in the statutory damages pro-
vision at first blush seems rather arbitrary. Reviewing cases decided from
1992 to 1997, and again from 2000 to 2002, however, Blair and I con-
cluded that: (1) courts tended to award statutory damages at the higher
end of the spectrum in cases involving infringement of a single work
over a long period of time or on multiple occasions; (2) in cases in which
courts were presented with evidence of the plaintiff's actual damages
(for example, in the form of lost licensing revenue), and the cost of de-
tecting the infringement was likely high, courts tended to award statutory
damages roughly double or triple the amount of those actual damages;
and (3) in other cases in which courts were presented with little or no
evidence of the amount of the plaintiff's actual loss or the defendant's
gain, they tended to award statutory damages at the lower end of the
spectrum. Indeed, some of the cases (both then and now) have set statu-
tory damages explicitly in reliance on factors such as:
(1) the expenses saved and the profits reaped; (2) the revenues
lost by the plaintiff; (3) the value of the copyright; (4) the deter-
rent effect on others beside the defendant; (5) whether the
defendant's conduct was innocent or wilful; (6) whether a de-
fendant has cooperated in providing particular records from
which to assess the value of the infringing material produced;
and (7) the potential for discouraging the defendant.
57. See supra text accompanying note 4.
58. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 46, at 80-82; see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas
F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1585, 1661 -69 (1998) (discussing the results of the 1992-97 research, as well
as the existence of some cases that did not fit the patterns).
59. Yash Raj Films (USA), Inc. v. Sidhu, No. CV F 09-0233 AWl GSA, 2010 WL
1032792, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (quoting Cartier v. Symbolix, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 2d
316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). Similar factors are relevant when calculating statutory damages
for trademark counterfeiting pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2006). See Philip Morris USA
Inc. v. Tammy's Smoke Shop, Inc., No. CV 09-1899 (LDW)(MLO), 2010 WL 2985491, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. July 19, 2010) ("In determining the amount of statutory damages, the Court con-
siders several factors, including, inter alia: the defendant's profits, the plaintiffs lost profits,
the defendant's willfulness, the size of defendant's counterfeiting operation, the defendant's
efforts to mislead and conceal, and the need to deter the defendant and others."); see also Blair
& Cotter, Economic Analysis, supra note 58, at 1660-61 (noting similar factors reflected in the
case law at the time).
One of the few commentators who has addressed the calculation of fines for false patent
marking has recently advocated the use of factors resembling the factors quoted above in this
context. See O'Neill, supra note 16, at 28. O'Neill notes that, in Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon
Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009), and Presidio Components Inc. v. American Techni-
cal Ceramics Corp., No. 08-CV-335-IEG (NLS), 2010 WL 1462757, at *42 (S.D. Cal. Apr.
13, 2010), "the courts considered the number of products falsely marked and the selling price
for those products," and suggests:
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We suggested that the patterns in the case law made "some rough eco-
nomic sense," in that "in awarding statutory damages, courts appear to
have at least some general idea of the probable harm or gain involved
and to be sensitive to the need to set an award high enough to encourage
... detection and enforcement.""
The standards courts use in awarding damages in unfair competition
and copyright litigation could prove useful in crafting appropriate fines
for false patent marking for several reasons. First, to the extent the fine
should approximate the social harm caused by false patent marking,
courts could look to these other bodies of law for guidance in estimating
the magnitude of that harm. Because one component of social harm is
the provable harm the plaintiff has suffered, courts could look to false
advertising law in particular for guidance on how to estimate the lost
profits and other expenses the plaintiff has incurred as a result of the de-
fendant's misrepresentation. As in false advertising litigation, however, it
often may be difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to quantify any such
damages (particularly if the plaintiff is a noncompetitor, and noncom-
petitor suits survive patent reform efforts). Any such inability or
unwillingness to prove lost profits should not necessarily be dispositive,
however. Indeed, even if the plaintiff can and does prove some quantifi-
able loss, imposing a fine merely equal to the amount of that loss may
not adequately compensate for other competitors' losses or for the al-
leged harm to consumers resulting from a decrease in competition. Other
factors therefore may also be relevant in evaluating (if only roughly) the
magnitude of the harm caused by the false marking-for example,
In the future, courts also may consider such factors as the extent of falsely marked
advertising, the duration of the false marking (especially after the defendant had
knowledge of the falsity), the defendant's profit margins on the falsely marked
products, the impact that any potential penalty would have on the defendant's busi-
ness, the strength of the evidence on the issue of intent, whether any competitors or
potential competitors incurred any actual harm as a result of the false marking, and
whether the public actually was deceived as a result of the false marking.
O'Neill, supra note 16, at 28-29 (footnote omitted).
60. BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 46, at 83. We have not exhaustively surveyed the
more recent cases, so whether these patterns have continued to hold up in more recent years is
uncertain. It is surely possible that the Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998), holding that litigants have a Seventh Amend-
ment right to a trial by jury on the amount of copyright statutory damages, has obscured the
patterns we perceived earlier. Even after Feliner, however, courts continue to set statutory
damages in some cases (such as Yash Raj Films). See supra text accompanying note 59.
Moreover, in some recent cases involving illegal file sharing, the courts have effectively over-
ruled jury awards of statutory damages as excessive. See Sony BMG Music Entm't v.
Teitelbaum, Civil Action No. 07cvl 1446-NG, 2010 WL 2705499, at *26-27 (D. Mass. July 9,
2010); Capital Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056-57 (D. Minn.
2010).
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whether the market in which the defendant sells its product is reasonably
competitive and innovative, or whether other firms within that market
appear to be deterred by the defendant's false claim that the technology
embodied in the product is patented.' Similarly, as in some of the cases
involving statutory damages, the length of time the misconduct has per-
sisted may be relevant in determining the magnitude of the fine.62
Evidence that consumers have been materially deceived might also sug-
gest that the false marking has resulted in lost sales to some
competitors.6 ' Although none of these factors may provide much preci-
sion in gauging the amount of the social harm, their presence (or
absence) might be relevant in estimating whether the social harm is
closer to the high or the low end of the spectrum. Absent evidence that
the plaintiff, other competitors, or consumers have suffered any tangible
harm, perhaps only a nominal fine would be appropriate.'
61. In the Stauffer litigation, for example, the evidence cited by the district court sug-
gests that other firms were using the same device (for adjusting bow ties to neck size) as
Brooks Brothers, under license from the owner of the trademark for the brand name of the
device. The fact that advertisements referred to some long-expired patents covering the device
arguably had little if any effect in discouraging competition or innovation in the bow tie mar-
ket. See Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), rev'd, Nos.
2009-1428, 2009-1430, 2009-1453, 2010 WL 3397419 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 2010); see also
McNamara v. Natural Organics, Inc., No. 10 C 3544, 2010 WL 3521850, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
1, 2010) ("McNamara's belief as to Natural Organics' asserted intent to deceive-a claimed
belief that it was seeking to 'gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace'-is materially
undercut by McNamara's having brought like Section 292(b) actions against Natural Organics'
competitors on the same asserted ground."). I thank Karin Cotter for suggesting the relevance
of the market's competitiveness on the issue of actual damages.
62. See supra text accompanying note 59; see also O'Neill, supra note 16, at 28-29
(suggesting that courts may want to consider factors such as "the number of products falsely
marked and the selling price for those products," as well as "the extent of falsely marked ad-
vertising, the duration of the false marking . . . , the defendant's profit margins on the falsely
marked products, the impact that any potential penalty would have on the defendant's busi-
ness, the strength of the evidence on ... intent," and evidence of any actual harm or
deception).
63. See O'Neill, supra note 16, at 29 (suggesting the relevance of such proof).
64. Whether the plaintiff or the defendant should have the burden of offering such
evidence is an interesting question. In the context of another federal qui tam statute, the False
Claims Act, a person who is found to have defrauded the federal government "is liable to the
United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than
$10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of
the act of that person." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). To recover treble "the amount of dam-
ages which the Government sustains," the relator must offer evidence of that amount. See,
e.g., Landau v. Lucasti, 680 F. Supp. 2d 659, 672 (D.N.J. 2010). Until recently, the False
Claims Act appears to have been by far the most commonly litigated federal qui tam action.
See John Martinez, Getting Back the Public's Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in American
Property Law, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 619, 628-30 & n.33 (2010) (discussing the False Claims Act
and citing a handful of other federal qui tam actions, including 35 U.S.C. § 292); see also
Drew A. Harker et al., Whistleblower Incentives and Protections in the Financial Reform Act,
127 BANKING L.J. 779 (2010) (comparing the whistleblower provisions of the recent Dodd-
Frank Act to both a qui tam action and to the IRS Whistleblower Program).
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Second, to the extent that the fine should approximate the defen-
dant's private gain from the false marking, courts again might look to
unfair competition law for guidance. Indeed, disgorgement might be a
more appropriate benchmark than actual harm, if only because success-
ful false marking claims necessarily entail proof of deceptive intent that
is arguably akin to the "willfulness" required in the trademark and false
advertising realm. On this analogy, the defendant would bear the bur-
den of proving the portion of its profits during the relevant time period
that were not attributable to the false marking.6 As in the false advertis-
ing realm, however, the disgorgement remedy may risk over-rewarding
the plaintiff, to the extent a defendant encounters difficulty proving the
portion of its profits not attributable to the misconduct at issue. Never-
theless, in the present context this risk may sometimes be insubstantial.
For example, if the defendant ceased its false marking far enough in ad-
vance of the entry of judgment, the defendant could then compare its
profit level before and after marking. If there is little or no difference (or
the difference can be explained by other market factors), the amount of
profit attributable to the false marking would appear to be minimal.67
Moreover, in a case in which the marking included some expired or non-
applicable patents along with a number of applicable subsisting patents,
the odds that any substantial portion of the defendant's profits were at-
tributable to the expired or non-applicable patents are probably low, all
other things being equal. Evidence comparing the value of technology
covered by the expired or non-applicable values to the technology cov-
ered by the applicable subsisting patents could either bolster or rebut this
inference. Finally, as in the example above involving actual damages,
The question of whether the fine imposed is unconstitutionally excessive has arisen in
some actions under the False Claims Act. Compare United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 239-42 (D.P.R. 2000) (holding that, on the facts of the case, the imposition of
civil fine in addition to treble actual damages would have constituted an unconstitutionally
excessive fine), with U.S. ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 737-48
(N.D. III. 2007) (holding that the fine imposed under False Claims Act was not unconstitu-
tionally excessive, and disagreeing with Cabrera-Diaz's approach to the constitutional issue).
To my knowledge, the question of whether the fine imposed in a false patent marking case is
unconstitutionally excessive has not been addressed in any reported decision thus far, and this
Essay does not undertake that analysis. In the event the issue does arise in some future case-
or in the event Congress amends 35 U.S.C. § 292 so as to permit only the recovery of actual
damages, see supra note 17-the discussion in the text above on estimating the actual harm
caused by false marking will, if anything, take on added significance.
65. See supra notes 13, 51-55 and accompanying text (discussing deceptive intent and
willfulness).
66. See Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
67. In a somewhat different context, courts often permit a plaintiff in a product dispar-
agement case to prove actual damages based on a comparison of its profits before and after the
disparaging conduct, taking into account other possible explanations for the variance. See,
e.g., Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1490 (D. Minn. 1996).
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evidence that other firms within the relevant market appeared to suffer
no ill effects from the false marking might dispel the inference that the
portion attributable to deceptive marking was significant.
Third, using the statutory damages framework as a guide, a court
should consider whether a low probability of detection or enforcement
counsels in favor of enhancing the fine beyond the social harm/private
gain baseline, or if the corresponding risk of deterring firms from lawful
marking (due to concerns over error and litigation costs, for example)
counsels against such an enhancement. In the abstract, it is difficult to
predict which way this consideration should tilt in the average case. On
the one hand, the diffuse and unquantifiable nature of the harm in some
cases may suggest that no affected party would have a substantial incen-
tive to sue if the fine were limited to the amount of proven harm. On the
other, if current experience (i.e., 400-plus false marking cases filed since
January 1, 2010)( is any guide, a good deal of false patent marking is
not particularly difficult to detect. Moreover, the defendant's private gain
may be both an adequate and more tractable measure of the social harm
resulting from false marking; if so, then the availability of a fine mirror-
ing that gain may provide a sufficient incentive for potential plaintiffs to
seek out violations. In a case in which there is no reasonable basis for
inferring either harm or gain, however, the need for an enhancement to
achieve optimal deterrence may be illusory. Any number times zero is
zero, and thus if only nominal harm or gain has occurred, a nominal fine
may be all that the facts warrant.
CONCLUSION
I have argued above that in setting fines for false patent marking,
courts should attempt to approximate the social harm or private gain
caused by a defendant's misconduct, rather than simply awarding some
arbitrary percentage of the defendant's gross revenue. In theory, that
harm (or benefit) could be substantial or it could be minimal; whichever
way it turns out, it would be preferable if the fine bore some rational re-
lation to that number. Awards that substantially depart from the proven
(or likely) harm (or benefit) risk either under-deterring false marking or
over-deterring lawful marking. Moreover, as the Federal Circuit itself
suggested in Forest Group, a very small per article fine may sometimes
be appropriate. Or, as another court put it in a false copyright marking
case from long, long ago:
68. See supra note 10.
69. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking
Plaintiff is not suing for the value of his services, or for injury to
his property, but simply to make profit to himself out of the
wrongs of others; and when a man comes in as an informer, and
in that attitude alone asks to have a half million dollars put into
his pocket, the courts will never strain a point to make his labors
light, or his recovery easy. o
In setting fines under the modern-day false patent marking statute, courts
should take these suggestions to heart. If and when the facts disclose no
basis for a large per article fine, nothing in the statutory text-or in pub-
lic policy-demands that the plaintiff (and the government on whose
behalf the plaintiff sues) be accorded an undeserved windfall.
That said, even under the system sketched out above, substantial un-
certainty often may attend the calculation of fines for false patent
marking; and the variation among possible outcomes, ranging from a
fine near zero to one of ten digits or more, may cause risk-averse agents
to avoid marking altogether.' Perhaps only legislative action can bring
the needed degree of certainty to this unruly body of law. Until Congress
takes action, however, the measures described in this Essay would help
to reduce uncertainty and bring some semblance of order to patent law's
latest cause cdibre.
70. Taft v. Stephens Lithographing & Engraving Co., 38 F. 28, 29 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1889). In response, one might argue that such an approach underestimates the ethical cost of
tolerating some intentionally deceptive false marking. See E-mail from Crouch to Author,
supra note 36 (suggesting that the approach set forth in this Essay "overlooks the issues of
punishment/denouncement/condemnation that often arise as part of the adjudication process in
criminal cases"). I agree that ethics are important. I also believe, however, that, in designing a
patent system, utilitarian principles-as opposed to an undue focus on the mental state of
either the patentee or an accused infringer-should be the paramount consideration. See Cot-
ter, supra note 44, at 314; cf NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 117-23 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (advocating the reform of certain
patent doctrines that hinge on subjective mental states).
71. See Cotter, supra note 45, at 33 & n.92 (discussing the relationship between vari-
ance and risk aversion); supra notes 24-26, 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing the
effects of competing incentives to mark and not mark).
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